Siloviki Inside by Staar, Richard
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy Perspective
2004-03
Siloviki Inside
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/3616
Boston University
PERSPECTIVE
Volume 14, No 3 (March-April 2004)
Siloviki Inside
By Richard Staar (1)
Several recent developments strongly suggest that Vladimir V. Putin is laying the 
foundations for a regime that would be dominated completely by a nationwide network 
of Federal Security Service (FSB) officers that would continue to function even after his 
second term as president expires in 2008.
The foundation for this development can be found in Presidential Decree No. 960, the 
text of which appeared without fanfare last summer. (2) This 5,653-word document 
supersedes five previous decrees concerning the secret police that had been issued 
between 1998 and 2001.
The same 2003 legislation, cited above, states that the president of Russia "directs 
activities of the FSB," whereas the government only "coordinates" them. Basic tasks of 
the FSB include administration of [police] organs and [military] troops; informing the 
president of threats to the security of Russia; counter-espionage against foreign 
countries and individuals, threatening the security of Russia; and coordination of federal 
executive organs involved with counter-espionage and domestic security.
Seventy-four specific FSB functions are listed in this decree, which also describes the 
duties of its director, who is appointed by the president of Russia. The document ends 
with an outline of the current FSB structure. This includes the statement that 
"administrative sections exist in the armed forces and security organs," which 
represents official reestablishment of the Soviet political commissar system throughout 
the military establishments.
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The last provision suggests that Putin may be worried about the possibility of a coup 
d’Ètat by the officers corps in the armed forces that could lead to his ouster. As a 
product of the former KGB and current FSB, he realizes that only the armed forces 
represent a potential threat to his own position as well as that of the secret police.
The Ruling Elite
An interview with Olga V. Kryshtanovskaia (3) about her research at the Institute of 
Sociology in Moscow elicited important data concerning the new governing class or 
federal-level elite. About 24 percent of these "inherited" officials have been replaced by 
Putin. One-fourth of the newcomers are from St. Petersburg, home town of the 
president. Most of these replacements have military, law enforcement, or security police 
backgrounds. The last category dominates.
Officers from the armed forces and internal affairs ministry comprise 15 percent of the 
Federation Council and are heavily concentrated in the national-level Security Council 
(more than one-half hold military rank). Seventy percent of the staffs that serve 
presidential representatives in the seven federal districts are men in uniform. They 
coordinate all military, law enforcement, and security agencies that operate throughout 
these districts.
Military and police officers occupy one-fourth of all government staff positions, a 
powerful "clique" in certain key ministries like communications, industry, economic 
development, and especially defense and internal affairs. An estimated six thousand 
FSB officers already occupy higher government positions. (4)
Most civilian ministries in Moscow have at least one deputy minister from the military or 
police. On the average, almost 25 percent of all central government officials come from 
the armed forces, security services, and law enforcement. (5) At the same time, the 
percentage of these employees with university diplomas dropped from 52.2 in 1993 to 
only 21.0 in 2003, ten years later.
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Progress toward consolidation of this vertical bureaucratic hierarchy can be seen in 
Table 1, based on data accumulated by Professor Olga Kryshtanovskaia. This expert 
suggests that, since government and media are now under Putin’s control, only the 
business world remains as the last target. Success there would complete central 
domination over the economy.
The foregoing pertains to executive authority in Russia. Legislative control had to await 
elections to parliament, which took place on 8 December 2003. Results could have 
been forecast in advance. Some twenty-three political parties were represented. Of the 
225 parliamentary seats, the pro-government movement United Russia took 117 as well 
as 105 of the 223 single-mandate districts.
Described by Putin as "free, honest, open, and democratic," his assessment varied from 
that of some five hundred Western observers sent by the Council of Europe as well as 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Both of these organizations 
concluded that the extensive use of the state apparatus and media favoritism to benefit 
the largest pro-presidential party had made the results a foregone conclusion. Putin can 
count on at least 300 seats in the 450-seat national legislature, or Duma. (6)
Perhaps even more significant is the earlier-cited presidential edict, which provides the 
Federal Security Service with oversight regarding
implementation of federal laws, presidential instructions, government decisions, and 
international agreements; preparation and enforcement of government programs; 
neutralization of threats to national security; counter-espionage; organized crime and 
attempts to seize power; special forces to combat terrorism; organization of police and 
armed forces to defend borders; defense of economic zones; protection of state secrets; 
security within the armed forces and other military formations; defense of the national 
security complex, nuclear industry, transport, and communications; and security over 
secret police organs.
3
This document lists seventy-four functions to be exercised throughout the eighty-nine 
administrative regions and the armed forces as well as other military organizations. See 
Table 2.
Conclusion
Regardless of whether Putin’s new legislature will modify the constitution and permit 
him to run for a third term, the system in place will not be changed. By the year 2008, 
the FSB’s tentacles will have spread to such an extent that nothing short of a revolution 
will be able to dislodge its control over the government and indeed the people of Russia.
Table 1
Military Personnel in Elite Groups (percentages)
Year Security Council Government
1988 4.8!  5.4
1993 33.3!  11.4
1999 46.4!  22.0
2002 58.3!  32.8
Source: Iurii Vasil’ev, "Glavnaia tema: Operativniki-plokhie strategii,"Moskovskie novosti, 
no. 26 (14 June 2003), p. 2.
TABLE 2
Percentage of Siloviki* in Elite Groups
Presidencies Government Personnel Top Leadership
Gorbachev (1988)! 5.4 4.8
Yel’tsin (1993) 11.4 33.3
(1999) 22.0 46.4
Putin (2002) 32.8 58.3
4
* former officers of the army, interior ministry, security services, and Office of the 
Prosecutor General
Source: Olga Kryshtanovskaia, Anatomy of the Russian Elite (Moscow), as cited in 
Arkady Ostrovsky, "Putin Oversees Big Rise in Influence of Security Apparatus," 
Financial Times (London), 1—2 November 2003, p. 3.
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